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Patrick Lin & Fritz Allhoff
Abstract Human enhancement, in which nanotech-
nology is expected to play a major role, continues to
be a highly contentious ethical debate, with experts on
both sides calling it the single most important issue
facing science and society in this brave, new century.
This paper is a broad introduction to the symposium
herein that explores a range of perspectives related to
that debate. We will discuss what human enhance-
ment is and its apparent contrast to therapy; and we
will begin to tease apart the myriad intertwined issues
that arise in the debate: (1) freedom & autonomy, (2)
health & safety, (3) fairness & equity, (4) societal
disruption, and (5) human dignity.
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Introduction
Homo sapiens has been such a prolific species, simply
because we are very good at relentlessly adapting to our
environment. At the most basic level, we have won
control over fire and tools to forge a new world around
us, we build shelter and weave clothes to repel the brutal
elements, and we raise animals and crops for predict-
ability in our meals. With our intellect and resourceful-
ness, we are thereby better able to survive this world.
However, it is not just the world around us that we
desire to change. Since the beginning of history, we
also have wanted to become more than human, to
become Homo superior. From the godlike command
of Gilgamesh, to the lofty ambitions of Icarus, to the
preternatural strength of Beowulf, to the mythical
skills of Shaolin monks, and to various shamans and
shapeshifters throughout the world’s cultural history,
we have dreamt—and still dream—of transforming
ourselves to overcome our all-too-human limitations.
In practice, this means that we improve our minds
through education, disciplined thinking, and meditation;
we improve our bodies with a sound diet and physical
exercise; and we train with weapons and techniques to
defend ourselves from those who would conspire to kill.
But today, something seems to be different. With
ongoing work to unravel the mysteries of our minds
and bodies, coupled with the art and science of
emerging technologies, we are near the start of the
Human Enhancement (or Engineering) Revolution.
Now we are not limited to “natural” methods to
enhance ourselves or to merely wield tools such as a
hammer or binoculars or a calculator. We are beginning
to incorporate technology within our very bodies, which
may hold moral significance that we need to consider.
These technologies promise great benefits for human-
ity—such as increased productivity and creativity,
longer lives, more serenity, stronger bodies and minds,
and more—though, as we will discuss later, there is a
question whether these things translate into happier
lives, which many see as the point of it all [42, 40].
As examples of emerging technologies, in early
2008, a couple imaginative inventions in particular,
among many, are closing the gap even more between
science fiction and the real world. Scientists have
conceptualized an electronic-packed contact lens that
may provide the wearer with telescopic and night
vision or act as an omnipresent digital monitor to
receive and relay information [39]. Another innova-
tion is a touch display designed to be implanted just
under the skin that would activate special tattoo ink
on one’s arm to form images, such as telephone-
number keys to punch or even a video to watch [34].
Together with ever-shrinking computing devices, we
appear to be moving closer to cybernetic organisms
(or “cyborgs”), that is, where machines are integrated
with our bodies or at least with our clothing in the
nearer-term. Forget about Pocket PCs, mobile phones,
GPS devices, and other portable gadgets; we might
soon be able to communicate and access those
capabilities without having to carry any external
device, thus raising our productivity, efficiency,
response time, and other desirable measures—in
short, enabling us to even better survive our world.
Technology is clearly a game-changing field. The
inventions of such things as the printing press,
gunpowder, automobiles, computers, vaccines, and
so on, have profoundly changed the world, for the
better we hope. But at the same time, they have also
led to unforeseen consequences, or perhaps conse-
quences that might have been foreseen and addressed
had we bothered to investigate them. Least of all, they
have disrupted the status quo, which is not necessarily
a terrible thing in and of itself; but unnecessary and
dramatic disruptions, such as mass displacements of
workers or industries, have real human costs to them.
As we will discuss, such may be the case as well with
human enhancement technologies, enabled by advances
in nanotechnology, micro-electro-mechanical systems
(MEMS), genetic engineering, robotics, cognitive
science, information technology, pharmacology, and
other fields [45].1
In this special issue of NanoEthics: Ethics for
Technologies that Converge on the Nanoscale, we
present several papers that examine many ethical and
social issues surrounding human enhancement tech-
nologies, especially driven by nanotechnology. For
instance, on the issue of whether such technologies
ought to be regulated or otherwise restricted, one
position is that (more than minimal) regulation would
hinder personal freedom or autonomy, infringing on
some natural or political right to improve our own
bodies, minds, and lives as we see fit [3, 6, 21, 36].
Others, however, advocate strong regulation—and even
a research moratorium—to protect against unintended
effects on society, such as the presumably-undesirable
creation of a new class of enhanced persons who could
outwit, outplay, and outlast “normal” or unenhanced
persons for jobs, in schools, at sporting contests, and so
on, among other reasons [16–18]. Still others seek a
sensible middle path between stringent regulation and
individual liberty [25, 19].
No matter where one is aligned on this issue, it is
clear that the human enhancement debate is a deeply
passionate and personal one, striking at the heart of
what it means to be human. Some see it as a way to
fulfill or even transcend our potential; others see it as
a darker path towards becoming Frankenstein’s mon-
ster. But before more fully presenting those issues, it
would be helpful to lay out some background and
context to better frame the discussion, as follows.
Definitions
First, we need to draw several important distinctions.2
Strictly speaking, “human enhancement” includes any
activity by which we improve our bodies, minds, or
1 For an overview of ethical and social issues beyond nano-
technology’s role in human enhancement, see [1, 30, 32].
2 We recognize that some advocates of human enhancement
argue against making such a distinction (e.g., [7]), which seems
to serve to more easily justify unrestricted human enhancement;
even if this position is tenable, we do not want to take that point
for granted here, which we will discuss below.
abilities—things we do to enhance our welfare. So
reading a book, eating vegetables, doing homework, and
exercising may count as enhancing ourselves, though we
do not mean the term this way in our discussion here.
These so-called “natural” human enhancements are
morally uninteresting because they appear to be unprob-
lematic to the extent that it is difficult to see why we
should not be permitted to improve ourselves through
diet, education, physical training, and so on.
Rather, allow us to stipulate for the moment that
“human enhancement” is about boosting our capabil-
ities beyond the species-typical level or statistically-
normal range of functioning for an individual [8].
Relatedly, “human enhancement” can be understood
to be different from “therapy”, which is about treat-
ments aimed at pathologies that compromise health or
reduce one’s level of functioning below this species-
typical or statistically-normal level [27]. Another way
to think about human enhancement technologies, as
opposed to therapy, is that they change the structure
and function of the body [19]. Admittedly, none of
these definitions is immune to objections, but they are
nevertheless useful as a starting point in thinking
about the distinction, including whether there really is
such a distinction.
Thus, corrective eyeglasses, for instance, would be
considered therapeutic rather than enhancement, since
they serve to bring your vision back to normal; but
strapping on a pair of night-vision binoculars would
count as human enhancement, because they give you
sight beyond the range of any unassisted human
vision. As another example, using steroids to help
muscular dystrophy patients regain lost strength is a
case of therapy; but steroid use by otherwise-healthy
athletes would give them new strength beyond what
humans typically have (thereby enabling them to set
new performance records in sports). And growing or
implanting webbing between one’s fingers and toes to
enable better swimming changes the structure and
function of those body parts, counting then as a case
of human enhancement and not therapy.
Likewise, as it concerns the mind, taking Ritalin to
treat attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
is aimed at correcting the deficit; but taken by other-
wise-normal students to enable them to focus better in
studying for exams is a form of human enhancement.
And where reading a book may indeed make you
more knowledgeable, it does not make you so much
smarter than most everyone else or push your intellect
past natural limits; on the other hand, a computer chip
implanted into your brain that gives you direct access
to Google or spreadsheets would provide mental
capabilities beyond the species-typical level.
The last example suggests a further distinction we
should make. By “human enhancement” we do not
mean the mere use of tools; that would render the
concept impotent, turning nearly everything we do
into cases of human enhancement. But if and when
these tools are integrated into our bodies, rather than
employed externally, then we will consider them to be
instances of human enhancement. Of course, this
raises the question: what is so special about incorpo-
rating tools as part of our bodies, as opposed to
merely using them externally to the body [7]? That is,
why should the former count as human enhancement,
but not the latter? A neural implant that gives access
to Google and the rest of the online world does not
seem to be different in kind to using a laptop
computer or Pocket PC to access the same, so why
should it matter that we are imbedding computing
power into our heads rather than carrying the same
capabilities with us by way of external devices?
We will not attempt to give a full discussion of that
point here, though it will be important to explore the
issue further, except to suggest that integrating tools
into our bodies (and perhaps with our everyday
clothing to the extent that we are rarely without our
clothes) appears to give us unprecedented advantages
which may be morally significant. These advantages
are that we would have easier, immediate, and
“always-on” access to those new capabilities as if
they were a natural part of our being; we would never
be without those devices, as we might forget to bring
a laptop computer with us to a meeting. And
assimilating tools with our persons creates an intimate
or enhanced connection with our tools that evolves
our notion of personal identity, more so than simply
owning things (as wearing name-brand clothes might
boost our sense of self). This may translate into a
substantial advantage for the enhanced person, more
so than gained by purchasing an office computer or
reading books or training with the best coaches.
The Therapy-Enhancement Distinction
Returning to an issue previously raised, some scholars
have reasonably objected to, or at least raised
difficulties with, the distinctions above; that is, they
argue that there is no real distinction between therapy
and enhancement. For instance, how should we think
about vaccinations: are they a form of therapy, or are
they an enhancement of our immune system [7, 8,
21]? On one hand, a vaccination seems to be an
enhancement in that there is no existing pathology it
is attempting to cure, merely a possible or likely
pathology wewish to avoid; but we are drawn to declare
it as some form of therapy—perhaps preventative
therapy—given its close association with medicine?
And if enhancements in general are ultimately found to
be socially or ethically problematic, then counting
vaccinations as enhancement opens the possibility that
it should be regulated or restricted, which would create a
serious public health disaster as well as a counter-
example to the claim that enhancements are problematic.
Thus, even critics of human enhancement may be loathe
to put vaccinations in the enhancement bucket, though
there does not seem to be an obviously superior reason to
think otherwise.
Another dilemma: If a genius were to sustain a
head injury, thereby reducing her IQ to merely the
“average” or “species-normal” range, would raising
her intelligence back to its initial “genius” level count
as therapy or enhancement [7]? Either one would
seem plausible, but is there a non-arbitrary reason for
answering the question either way? If an enhancement,
then how do we explain the difference between that
and a clear (or clearer) case of therapy in which we
return an “average” person who sustains a head injury
back to the “normal” IQ range?
The therapy-enhancement distinction holds real
stakes, beyond athletic and academic competition.
Recent news reports show that the US military is
increasingly prescribing anti-depressants to soldiers in
combat to alleviate post-traumatic stress as well as
stimulants to counteract sleep deprivation—actions
which could be viewed as either creating a more
effective, level-headed soldier or returning the soldier
to the initial “normal” state of combat readiness,
further blurring the distinction [46, 50].3
The above cases notwithstanding, we would agree
that there are difficulties in precisely defining “human
3 However, if the military were to prescribe such medications
prior to combat, then one could make the case for counting that
as an enhancement; but this may take us full circle back to the
vaccination question, particularly as soldiers are routinely
vaccinated against bio-threats such as anthrax.
enhancement” (as there is with making clear definitions
of nearly any other concept), but maintaining the
enhancement-therapy distinction, at least until it can be
more fully explored, is nonetheless important for
several reasons:
First, to the extent that pro-enhancement advocates
are primarily the ones arguing against the therapy-
enhancement distinction, if a goal is to engage the
anti-enhancement camp, then it would make for a far
stronger case to meet those critics on their own
ground (i.e., to grant the assumption that such a
distinction exists). If it proves overly charitable to
grant this assumption such that the pro-enhancement
position is too difficult to defend without it, then
perhaps more attention needs to be paid in arguing
against the distinction in the first place, given that the
debate may hinge on this fundamental issue.
Second, by not making these distinctions, specif-
ically between therapy and enhancement, it may be
too easy to argue that all forms of human enhancement
are morally permissible given that the things we count
as therapy are permissible. That is to say, we risk
making a straw man argument that does not make a
compelling case either for or against any aspect of
human enhancement. Again, if the human enhancement
debate turns on this distinction, then much more
attention should be paid to defending or criticizing the
distinction than has been to date.
Third, at least part of the reason that human
enhancement is believed to be the most important issue
in the 21st century by both sides of the debate [26]
seems to be that it represents a collision between our
intuitions and our actions. For instance, critics may
believe that human enhancement technologies give an
unfair advantage to some persons, fracturing local or
global societies (even more) between the haves and
have-nots [17, 18, 42, 49]. Yet, at the same time, they
seem to endorse—to the extent that they have not
raised objections to—our use of existing technologies
(e.g., mobile phones, computers, Internet) that also
seem to countenance the same division to which
human enhancement technologies are said to lead us.
As another example, advocates of human enhance-
ment may believe that individual autonomy should
trump health and safety concerns, e.g., athletes should
be permitted to take steroids or adults should be
allowed to take mood-enhancing drugs at will [36,
48]. Yet, at the same time, they do not offer objections
to keeping some drugs illegal, such as crystal meth or
crack cocaine, which becomes an evenmore complicated
dilemma if they advocate legalizing other contraband
such as marijuana.
This is not to say that these tensions with our
intuitions are irresolvable, but only that “common
sense” is at stake for both sides of the debate. And the
initial intuition for the overwhelming majority of us is
that there is a therapy-enhancement distinction (since
we understand “therapy” and “enhancement” as mean-
ingfully discrete terms, even if some cases do not
neatly fit into either category). So it would be more
interesting for pro-enhancement advocates to reconcile
their position with that intuition, if possible, rather than
to reject the distinction, which is less satisfying. Or if
the therapy-enhancement distinction really is untena-
ble, then more vigorous argument seems to be needed
before we are prepared to cast aside our intuition.
Fourth, the famous philosophical puzzle “The
Paradox of the Heap” should be recalled here: Given
a heap of sand with N number of grains of sand, if we
remove one grain of sand, we are still left with a heap
of sand (that now only has N-1 grains of sand). If we
remove one more grain, we are again left with a heap
of sand (that now has N-2 grains). If we extend this
line of reasoning and continue to remove grains of
sand, we see that there is no clear point P where we
can definitely say that a heap of sand exists on one
side of P, but less than a heap exists on the other side.
In other words, there is no clear distinction between a
heap of sand and a less-than-a-heap or even no sand
at all. However, the wrong conclusion to draw here is
that there is no difference between them or that the
distinction between a heap and no-heap should be
discarded (or between being bald and having hair, as a
variation of the paradox goes). Likewise, it would
seem fallacious to conclude that there is no difference
between therapy and enhancement or that we should
dispense with the distinction. It may still be the case
that there is no moral difference between the two, but
we cannot arrive at it through the argument that there
is no clear defining line or that there are some cases
(such as vaccinations, etc.) that make the line fuzzy.
As with ‘heap’, the terms ‘therapy’ and ‘enhancement’
may simply be vaguely constructed and require more
precision to clarify the distinction.
Therefore, at least for the time being and for the
purposes of this paper, we will assume that a therapy-
enhancement distinction is defensible and illuminative,
at least where it aligns with our intuitions.
Scenarios
Given the above stipulations about what counts as hu-
man enhancement, let us lay out a fewmore scenarios—
real, possible, and hypothetical—to further clarify what
wemean by human enhancement.We can loosely group
these scenarios into three categories: mental perfor-
mance, physical performance, and other applications.
In the area of improving mental performance,
individuals are already using pharmaceuticals avail-
able today to achieve such goals as increased
productivity, creativity, serenity, and happiness. We
previously mentioned Ritalin use, intended for ADHD
patients, by otherwise-normal students to boost
concentration as a way to study more effectively. In
sports, drugs such as beta-blockers, intended to treat
high blood pressure and other disorders by slowing
down the heart rate, have been used to reduce anxiety
as a way to boost physical performance, such as in
preparing for an important and nerve-racking putt in
golf or steadying an archer’s hand to better release the
arrow in between heartbeats. In warfare, anti-depressants
and stimulants have been used to treat post-traumatic
stress and sleep deprivation, thereby creating better,
more effective soldiers. And, of course, hallucinogenic
and other recreational drugs, including alcohol, continue
to be used (and used famously by some authors and
artists) to achieve greater creativity, relaxation, and even
enlightenment.
In the future, as technology becomes more inte-
grated with our bodies, we can expect neural implants
of the kind we mentioned above that effectively puts
computer chips into our brains or allows devices to be
plugging directly into our heads, giving us always-on
access to information as well as unprecedented
information-processing powers. New and future vir-
tual reality programs are able to much better simulate
activities, for instance, to train law enforcement offi-
cers and soldiers in dangerous situations so that they
can respond better to similar events in the real world.
In the area of physical performance, steroids use by
athletes is one of the most obvious examples.
Cosmetic surgery has also grown in popularity, not
for corrective purposes but to increase (perceived)
attractiveness. Prosthetic limbs have improved to such
a degree that they are already enabling its wearer
greater than normal strength and capabilities, sparking
a debate on whether athletes with those artificial limbs
may participate in the Olympics [13].
In the future, we can expect continuing advances in
robotics and bionanotechnology to give us cybernetic
body parts, from bionic arms to artificial noses and
ears, that surpass the capabilities of our natural body.
Today, research organizations such as MIT’s Institute
for Soldier Nanotechnologies are working on an
exoskeleton to give the wearer superhuman strength
as well as flexible battlesuits that can, for instance,
harden when needed to create a splint or tourniquet to
attend to injuries more quickly and effectively [35].
And we previously mentioned innovative designs
such as for a contact lens that enables us to see in
the dark or receive information from a miniature
digital monitor. Further, designs have already been
drawn for even more fantastic innovations such as a
respirocyte: an artificial red blood cell that holds a
reservoir of oxygen [15]. A respirocyte would come
in handy for, say, a heart attack victim to continue
breathing for an extra hour until medical treatment is
available, despite a lack of blood circulation to the
lungs or anywhere else. But in an otherwise-healthy
athlete, a respirocyte could boost performance by
delivering extra oxygen to the muscles, as if the
person were breathing from a pure oxygen tank.
And perhaps as an example of both mental and
physical enhancement, we should also consider life
extension, whether it comes by curing fatal patholo-
gies (such as cancer) or rejuvenating the body/mind or
developing anti-aging medicine, and whether it
enables us to live another 20 years or 100 years or
1,000 years (radical life extension). This is a particularly
contentious issue in the human engineering debate, not
just for obvious concerns related to the burden of
overpopulation on quality of life or loss of meaning in
life, but also because it seems that we are already—and
presumably unproblematically—extending our lives
through better nutrition, medicine, exercise, sanitation,
and so forth; yet there is something troubling to many
about the prospect of radical life extension, even if we
can all agree that, in principle, more life is better than
less life. We will return to this below.
Other applications include enhancements that may
seem gratuitous, such as attempting to physically
transform into a lizard by tattooing scales all over
one’s body and forking one’s tongue, or into a cat by
implanting whiskers, sharpening teeth and clipping
one’s ears, or into something other than human with
implanted horns in one’s forehead; all of these
procedures have been done already. In the future, we
can envision the possibility that prosthetic flippers,
designed today for dolphins, might be requested by
humans, along with artificial gills, etc., who want to
transform into an aquatic animal. This type of
enhancements, of course, brings to the forefront the
question whether ‘enhancement’ is the right word to
use in the debate in the first place, as opposed to
simply ‘human engineering’ or a more neutral term
that does not imply improvement. Indeed, even in
cases where technology boosts mental and physical
capabilities, it seems that we cannot predict with any
accuracy whether there will be any negative psycho-
logical or physiological side-effects that will offset the
intended benefits of a particular enhancement. For
instance, in drinking alcohol as a mood-enhancer of
sorts, we already know that it can hold the unintended
effect of a painful hangover; and steroids taken by
athletes can have disastrous health consequences.
Moreover, if human enhancement can be ultimately
defended, then un-enhancements may seem to be
morally permissible as well, if individual autonomy is
the most important value to consider in the debate.
There are already medical cases in which: individuals
want to amputate some healthy limb from their bodies
[12]; parents want to stunt the growth of their
bedridden child to keep her portable and easier to care
for [14]; and deaf parents who specifically want a deaf
baby in selecting embryos for in vitro fertilization [11].
Un-enhancements aside, we will continue to use
‘enhancement’ in this paper for the most part, since
there is a presumption that whatever technology is
integrated with our bodies will be expected to deliver
some net benefit, real or perceived (otherwise, why do
it?). Further, we will limit our discussion here
primarily to those technologies that enhance human
cognitive and physical abilities, rather than seemingly-
gratuitous procedures or un-enhancements.
The Issues
Now, given the above understanding of human
enhancement, let us tease apart the myriad issues that
arise in the debate. These too are loose non-exclusive
categories that may overlap with one another, but
perhaps are still useful in providing an overview of
the debate: (1) freedom & autonomy; (2) health &
safety; (3) fairness & equity; (4) societal disruption;
(5) human dignity.
Let us make a couple of preliminary notes. First,
just as no one could predict with much accuracy how
the Internet Revolution would unfold, raising policy
issues from privacy to piracy and beyond, the same is
likely true with the Human Engineering Revolution;
that is, the framework presented below will undoubt-
edly evolve over time. However, this does not mean
that we should not attempt to address the issues we
are able to anticipate. Second, the objective of this
paper is neither to anticipate nor fully address any
given issue, but simply to broadly sketch the major
issues, many of which will be expounded upon by the
papers in this symposium. Therefore, the following
discussion will raise more questions than it answers in
constructing that framework.
Freedom & Autonomy
There is perhaps no greater value, at least in
democracies, than the cherished concepts of freedom
and autonomy. (The distinction between the two is not
critical to this discussion, so we will not take the
space to give a precise definition here; but allow us to
stipulate that, at minimum, both concepts are about
negative liberty, or the absence of constraints.) But
because freedom and autonomy are central to the
issue of human enhancement, they add much fuel to
the impassioned debate.
Pro-enhancement advocates have argued against
regulating enhancements on the grounds that it would
infringe on our fundamental ability to choose how we
want to live our own lives [6, 21, 36]. Or, in other
words, if enhancing our bodies does not hurt anyone
(other than possibly ourselves; more on this in the
next section), then why should we be prevented from
doing so? This is a common objection—arguing
especially against governmental intervention—to any
number of proposals that involve regulation, from
hiring practices to home improvements to school
clothing and so on.
Though freedom and autonomy may be viewed in
democracies as “sacred cows” that ought not be
corralled, the reality is that we do not have complete
freedom or autonomy is the areas of life that we think
we do anyway. As examples, freedom of the press and
freedom of speech do not protect the individual from
charges of libel, slander, or inciting panic by yelling
“Fire!” in a crowded theater; our privacy expectations
quietly give way to security measures, such as
searches on our property and persons at airports or
eavesdropping on our communications; and even
ancestral homes built by the hands of one’s forefa-
thers could be unilaterally seized (and demolished) by
the state under eminent domain laws. This is to say
that whatever rights we have also imply responsibilities
and exist within some particular political system,
therefore it is not unreasonable to expect or define
certain limits for those rights, especially where they
conflict with other rights and obligations.
Maximal freedom is a hallmark of a laissez-faire or
minimal state, but a democratic society is not
compelled to endorse such a stance, as some political
philosophers have suggested (e.g., [37]). Nor would
reasonable people necessarily want unrestricted free-
dom anyway, e.g., no restrictions or background
checks for gun ownership. Even the most liberal
democracy today understands the value of regulations
as a way to enhance our freedom. For instance, our
economic system is not truly a “free market”: though
we may advocate freedom in general, regulations
exist not only to protect our rights, but also to create
an orderly process that greases the economic wheel,
accelerating both innovations and transactions. As a
simpler example, by imposing laws on traffic, we can
actually increase our freedom: by driving forward on
only one side of the road, for instance, we can be
(more) assured that we will not be a victim of a head-on
collision, which makes driving faster a more sensible
proposition.
There is another sense, related to free will, in
which cognitive enhancements may be infringing: if
an enhancement, such as a mood-altering drug or
neural implant, interferes or alters our deliberative
process, then it is an open question whether or not we
are truly acting freely while under the influence of the
enhancement. For instance, a “citizen chip” embedded
in the brain might cause us to be unswervingly
patriotic and hold different values than we would
otherwise have. Further, external pressure by or from
peers, employers, competitors, national security, and
others also may unduly influence one’s decision
making. [20].
Health & Safety
To justify restrictions on our freedom and autonomy,
of course, we would need strong, compelling reasons
to offset that prima facie harm; specifically, we need
to identify conflicting values that ought to be factored
into our policymaking. One possible reason is that
human enhancement technologies may pose a health
risk to the person operated upon, similar to illegal or
unprescribed steroids use by athletes: given how
precious little we still know about how our brains
and other biological systems work, any tinkering with
those systems would likely give rise to unintended
effects, from mild to most serious [42]. Even drinking
pure water—perhaps the safest thing we can do to our
own bodies—may have some harms. For example,
maybe we become dependent on fluoridated water to
prevent tooth decay or drink too much water which
dilutes sodium in the body to dangerously-low or fatal
levels. Or consider that many of the foods we eat
everyday are suspected to have some causal connection
to disease or unwanted conditions. It is therefore quite
likely that making radical changes to our bodies
undoubtedly will have surprising side-effects.
Is this reason enough to restrict human enhancement
technologies, for the sake of protecting the would-be
patient? The answer is not clear. Even if such
technologies prove to be so dangerous or risky that we
strongly believe we need to protect individuals from
their own decisions to use those technologies (through
paternalistic regulations), the well-informed individual
might circumvent this issue by freely and knowingly
consenting to those risks, thereby removing this reason
for restricted use.
But even this case does not solve the conflict
between freedom/autonomy and health/safety. First, it
is not always clear whether a person’s consent is
sufficiently informed or not. For instance, consider a
partygoer who may have heard that smoking cigarettes
can be addictive and harmful but nonetheless begins to
smoke anyway; this seems to be a less-informed
decision than one made by a person with a parent
whose smoking caused a specific and horrible illness
(and associated expenses). Furthermore, the partygoer
may be unduly influenced by peers or movies that
glamorize smoking. So paternalistic regulations could
be justified under some circumstances; e.g., where
risks are not adequately communicated or understood,
for children, and so on.
Second, the assumption that a procedure to implant
some human enhancement technology may affect the
health and safety of only that patient appears to be
much too generous. Indeed, it is rare to find any
human activity that has absolutely no impact on other
persons, either directly or indirectly, such that our
own freedom or autonomy is the only value at stake
and clearly should be protected. For instance, oppo-
nents to regulating such activities as gambling, recrea-
tional drugs (including smoking tobacco), prostitution,
segregation, and so forth commonly cite the need to
protect their freedom or rights as the primary objection
to those regulations. Yet, this objection ignores the
opposing argument, which is that such activities may
harm other persons, either actually or statistically.
To look at just one of many examples, at first
glance, unfettered gambling seems to affect only the
gambler (it is his money to win or lose, so the
argument goes); but a broader analysis would point
out that many gamblers have families whose bank
accounts are being risked and that desperate gamblers
may commit crimes to finance their addiction, never
mind harms to the out-of-control gambler himself.
Even marijuana use, which in many cases may be
justified and allegedly harms no one, might be traced
back to dangerous cartels that terrorize or bully the
local population. Furthermore, irresponsible use of the
drug could cause accidents or the user to neglect his
or her obligations, family, etc. Notice here that we are
not arguing that activities such as gambling and
recreational drug use should be completely banned,
but only that some measure of oversight seems to be
appropriate for the sake of others, if not also for the
welfare of the individual.
Relating back to the human enhancement debate, it
seems premature to say that only the would-be
enhanced person assumes any risk, even if the
procedure does not affect his or her germline (i.e.,
cannot be passed on to the next generation). The harm
or risk to others could also be indirect: Where steroids
use by athletes sets the presumably-wrong example
for children whose bodies and minds are still
developing, we can anticipate a similar temptation to
be created with human enhancement technologies
among children. Even parents may feel pressure—or
even an obligation—to enhance their children, which
arises from the natural desire to want the best for our
children or, in this case, make them the best they can be.
Third, even if the harm that arises from any given
instance of human enhancement is so small to be
practically negligible, the individual choices to en-
hance oneself can lead to aggregate harms that are
much larger and substantial. For instance, in today’s
environmental debate, calls are increasing to limit
activities from lawn care or drinking bottled water: on
one hand, the amount of extra water needed to keep
one’s lawn green seems small, as is also the amount
of fertilizer or pesticide that might leach into the
groundwater, but the cumulative effect of millions of
homeowners caring for a pristine patch of grass can
be disastrous for a nation’s water supply and health.
Likewise, as human enhancement technologies
improve and are adopted by more people, the once-
negligible harms that arise from individual cases may
metastasize into very real harms to large segments of
society [38]. Life extension, as one case, may appear
to be a great benefit for the individual, but on an
aggregate scale, it could put pressure or burdens on
families, retirement programs, overpopulation, and so
on; we will return to this below.
Fairness & Equity
Even if we can understand why there would be pressure
to enhance one’s self or children, it is important to note
the following: advantages gained by enhanced persons
also imply a relative disadvantage for the unenhanced,
whether in sports, employment opportunities, academic
performance, or any other area. That is to say, fairness
is another value to consider in the debate. A related
worry is that the wealthy would be the first adopters of
human enhancement technologies, given that they can
best afford such innovations (like LASIK eye surgery),
thus creating an even wider gap between the haves and
the have-nots [33].
In considering the issue of fairness, we need to be
careful to not conflate it with equity. Under most
economic theories, fairness does not require that we
need to close the gap entirely between economic
classes, even when justice is defined as fairness ([43];
for an application of Rawls to enhancement, see [1]).
Indeed, there are good reasons to think that we want
some gap to exist, for example, to provide incentives
for innovations, in order to move up the economic
ladder, and to allow flexibility in a workforce to fill
vacancies and perform a wide range of tasks. At least
some competition seems to be desirable, especially
when resources to be allocated are limited or scarce
and when compared to the historically-unsuccessful
alternative of the state attempting to equalize the
welfare of its citizens.
Thus, inequality itself is not so much the point,
though any poverty or decline in welfare related to
increased inequality may be a serious concern. We do
not want people to stop striving to improve their own
lives, even if the situation for others is not improved
at the same time or ever. And natural advantages and
inequities already exist unproblematically anyway;
Hobbes recognized that these organic differences did
not give any individual or group of individuals so
much net advantage that they would be invulnerable
to the “nasty, brutish, and short“ conditions that mark
human life [24].
Yet if human enhancement technologies develop as
predicted, they can afford us a tremendous advantage
in life; e.g., over others in a competition for resources,
so much so that it overstretches the natural range of
equality to the point where inequality becomes a more
salient issue. This is where the gap between enhanced
and unenhanced persons may be too wide to bridge,
making the latter into dinosaurs in a hypercompetitive
world. If we assume that the benefits of being an
enhanced person must be largely paid from the
welfare of others, e.g., a job-gain by one person is a
job-loss by another, since the others are now at a
relative disadvantage, this may impoverish the unen-
hanced, which would limit their access to such things
as healthcare, legal representation, political influence,
and so on.
Related to the notion of equity is that of fairness.
Even if pronounced inequality is morally permissible,
there is still a question of how an individual accesses
or affords a human enhancement technology, which
may be unfair or unacceptably magnify the inequality.
If the distribution of or access to enhancement
technologies is not obviously unfair, e.g., illegally
discriminatory, then perhaps we can justify the
resulting inequities. But what would count as a fair
distribution of those technologies? A scheme based
on need or productivity or any other single dimension
would be easily defeated by the standard arguments
that they overlook other relevant dimensions [44].
Even if a market system is considered to be fair or an
acceptable approximation of it—which is highly
contestable, especially after a fresh round of job
layoffs and mortgage defaults—many still object to
the unfairness of our starting points, which may date
back to monarchies, aristocracies, “robber barons”
(recall the saying that behind every great fortune there
is a great crime), bad luck and other arbitrary
circumstances [9]. And even if the starting points
were fair, the subsequent market processes would
need to be fair in order for the results (e.g., that only the
wealthy can afford human enhancement technologies,
who then gain significant advantages over the unen-
hanced) to be declared fair [32].
Societal Disruption
Fairness and equality are not just theoretical values,
but they have practical effects. Gross inequality itself,
whether fair or not, can motivate the worse-off masses
to revolt against a state or system. But societal
disruption need not be so extreme to be taken
seriously. Entire institutions today—as well as the
lack thereof—are based on a specific range of abilities
and rough equality of natural assets. Sports, for
instance, would change dramatically, if enhanced
persons are permitted to compete to the clear
disadvantage to unenhanced athletes, smashing their
previous records. (This is not to say that sports should
ban enhanced competitors, only that doing so would
have a real, significant effect on careers and expend
valuable resources to adjust sporting programs and
contests; and in the end, it is not clear that sports is
better off for its trouble or that which it has caused.)
Other institutions and systems include economic
(jobs), privacy, communications, pensions, security,
and many other areas of society. For instance, if life-
extension technologies can increase our average
lifespan by 20 years (let alone the 100+ years
predicted by some futurists [10, 28], and assuming
that the extra 20 years will be a good life, not one
bogged down with illness and unproductivity that
afflict many elderly today), then we would need to
radically adjust retirement programs: do we move the
retirement age to 85, which has negative consequen-
ces for job-seekers such as new tenure-track academic
faculty, or increase contributions to pension plans,
which puts pressure on household budgets and
employers? Or both? Also, assuming birth rates do
not decline (which causes problems of its own),
longer lives will mean more pressure on resources
such as energy and food, in addition to jobs, so this
could disrupt society in negative ways.
Looking more into the distance, if enhancement
technologies enable us to adapt our bodies to, say,
underwater living (with implantable gills, flippers,
echolocation, new skin, etc.), then we would need to
construct new institutions to govern that lifestyle,
from underwater real estate to pollution rules to law
enforcement to handling electronic devices to curren-
cy (replacing paper money of non-waterworlds). Or if
this sounds too far-fetched, consider humanity’s rush
into outer space that will require similar attention to
be paid to such issues in the near future [29].
Other nearer-term scenarios that may cause social
disruption include: a job candidate with a neural
implant that enables better data retention and faster
information processing would consistently beat out
unenhanced candidates; a person with super-human
hearing or sight could circumvent existing privacy
protections and expectations by easily and undetectably
eavesdropping or spying on others; more students (and
professors) using Ritalin may grab admission or tenure
at all the best universities, reducing those opportunities
for others; and so on.
So societal disruption is a non-trivial concern and
seems to be something we want to mitigate where we
can, though this does not imply that we should resist
change in general. Minimizing disruption might be
achieve by transitioning laid-off workers immediately to
a new job or job-training program, rather than allowing
the layoffs to come unexpectedly which leaves the
newly-unemployed with few options but to fend for
themselves. Today, without this kind of preparation, we
trust that these social and economic disruptions eventu-
ally will be handled, but there is still a real cost to those
affected by layoff that could have been better mitigated.
The typewriter industry, as an example, was blindsided
by the fast-growing word-processing industry in the
1980s, leading to the displacement of thousands of
workers, both on the manufacturing and the end-users’
sides. (Similar situations exist for the spreadsheet
industry that displaced countless accountants and book-
keepers, the computer-aided design industry that dis-
placed graphic artists, and so on.)
But, unless it will be clearly and seriously harmful,
social disruption by itself does not seem enough to
count as a strong reason against regulating enhance-
ment technologies. After all, we do not wish that
typewriters were never replaced with word-processing
programs, though we hope the affected employees
readily found gainful jobs elsewhere. Human en-
hancement technologies, likewise, do not necessarily
need to be halted or regulated, but it seems more
prudent and responsible to anticipate and prepare for
any disruptive effects.
To be clear, there presumably will be benefits to
society from enhanced persons. We can expect greater
productivity or more creative and intellectual break-
throughs, which is why individuals would want to be
enhanced in the first place. But what remains difficult to
calculate is whether these gains outweigh the costs or
risks, or even the likelihood of either gains or costs—
which is needed if we do find it sensible to use a
precautionary principle to guide our policymaking.
Human Dignity
The fiercest resistance to human enhancement tech-
nologies is perhaps a concern about their effect on
“human dignity” and what it means to be human [42,
47]. For instance, does the desire for enhancement
show ingratitude for what we have and (further)
enable an attitude of unquenchable dissatisfaction
with one’s life? Some researchers suggest that
discontent is hardwired into the genetic makeup of
humans [23, 52], which is why we constantly
innovate, strive to achieve and gain more, etc.
However, even if this is true, it does not seem to be
so much an argument to promote human enhancement
technologies, but more a worry that those technologies
are not the panacea or Holy Grail of happiness we
might believe them to be; that is, we will still be
dissatisfied with ourselves no matter how much we
enhance ourselves (unless, of course, we somehow
eradicate that part of our DNA that causes discontent).
Would human enhancement technologies hinder
moral development? Many believe that “soul-making”
is impossible without struggle [22], and achievements
ring hollow without sacrifice or effort [42]; so if
technology makes life and competitions easier, then we
may lose opportunities to feed and grow our moral
character. On the other hand, compare our lives today
with pre-Internet days: increased connectivity to
friends, work, information, etc. is often a double-edged
proposition that also increases stress and decreases free
time. This, then, raises the related concern of whether
enhancement technologies will actually make our lives
happier. (If the research mentioned above about
discontent in our genes is accurate, then we might
have a psychobiological reason to think not.)
Is the frailty of the human condition necessary to
best appreciate life? There is something romantic
about the notion of being mortal and fallible. But with
existing pharmacology, we could eliminate the emo-
tion of sadness today, and work is continuing on
drugs that repress memories; but it is not clear that
sadness (at least in the normal range, as opposed to
clinical depression) is a “pathology“ we should want
to eliminate, rather than a human experience that we
should preserve [42]. Other critics have suggested that
life could be too long, leading to boredom after one’s
life-goals are achieved (e.g., [51]).
Finally, we will mention here the related, persistent
concern that we are playing God with world-changing
technologies, which is presumably bad [41]. But what
exactly counts as “playing God”, and why is that
morally wrong; i.e., where exactly is the proscription
in religious scripture? If we define the concept as
manipulating nature, then we all have been guilty of
that since the first man picked up a stick. Making life-
and-death decisions is a plausible candidate as a
definition, but then physicians as well as soldiers
(even in holy wars?) could be accused of this charge.
Restricting Human Enhancement Technologies
Given the preceding discussion, it should be clear that
human enhancement is more than just about the
individual’s freedom or autonomy, but there are
plausibly negative consequences on others and society
that need to be considered. Or at least an argument
needs to be made that freedom/autonomy trumps all
other values, but such a position seems unnecessarily
dogmatic. These issues point to the policy dilemma of
whether we should have regulations or restrictions on
human enhancement technologies, so to prevent or
mitigate some of the negative impacts considered.
Three answers suggest themselves: (1) no restrictions,
(2) some restrictions, or (3) a moratorium or full ban.
A moratorium seems unrealistic to the extent that a
worldwide one would be needed to truly stem the use
of human enhancement technologies, and that no
worldwide moratorium on anything has yet to work,
including on (alleged) attempts to clone a human
being. A local moratorium would send patients to
“back-alley” enhancement clinics or to more liberal
regions of the world, as is the case with “cosmetic-
surgery vacations” in which those medical procedures
are less expensive in other nations. Further, a ban on
enhancement research seems to bemuch too premature—
an overreaction to perceived, future risks—as well as a
real threat to therapy-related research today.
On the other side of the spectrum, the idea of
having no restrictions on human enhancement tech-
nologies seems to be reckless or at least unjustifiably
optimistic, given that there are plausible risks. As
pointed out earlier, complete freedom or autonomy
may be a recipe for disaster and chaos in any case; we
do not want to grant the right to yell “Fire!” in a
crowded venue or the right for dangerous felons to
own firearms.4
So what about finding middle ground with some
non-Draconian regulations? Critics have argued that
any regulation would be imperfect and likely ineffec-
tual, much like laws against contraband or prostitution
[36]; but it is not clear that eliminating these laws
would improve the situation, all things considered.
Also, as a society, we still believe we ought to at least
try to solve social ills, even if we cannot ultimately fix
the entire problem, e.g., we cannot stop any given
crime from ever occurring again, yet we still have
laws against such acts. And even if there are practical
reasons to not pursue regulations, would that send the
wrong message; e.g., to children, that we countenance
or support enhancement without reservations?
The issue of regulation will surely not be settled
here, nor do we intend it to. Yet it is important to keep
in mind that the human enhancement debate is not
just a theoretical discussion about ethics, but it has
bearing on the real world with policy decisions that
may affect not just the would-be enhanced, but also
researchers, manufacturers, social institutions, as well
as our ideals of freedom and human dignity.5
A Symposium on Nanotechnology & Human
Enahancement
In the interest of exploring the above issues and
others, we have put together five papers in the
following symposium. These papers each take different
perspectives on the enhancement debate, though all
provide valuable contributions to it. The first paper is
“Nanotechnology: Considering the Complex Ethical,
Legal, and Societal Issues with the Parameters of
Human Performance” by Linda MacDonald Glenn
(Alden March Bioethics Institute/Albany Medical
Center; University of Vermont College of Nursing)
4 Perhaps even the right to be happy may be inappropriately
exercised, say, at a funeral? 
5 For more about the general debate on regulation in nanotech-
nology, see [31]. 
and Jeanann S. Boyce (Montgomery College), pro-
vides more background and further examination of the
many strands in the nanotechnology and human
enhancement debate, particularly their link to relevant
legal decisions and opinions.
Continuing the theme in law, the second paper,
“Enhancing Justice?” by Tamara Garcia and Ronald
Sandler (both of Northeastern University), begins to
narrow our inquiry on the central issue of social
justice, specifically asking whether human enhance-
ment technologies would likely be justice-impairing
or justice-promoting. They conclude that the associated
challenges to social justice challenges cannot be
remedied by technological design and innovation
alone; rather, we must also address problematic
features of social, political, and economic practices,
policies, and institutions.
Our third paper, “Nanotechnology, Enhancement,
and Human Nature” by Nicole Hassoun (Carnegie
Mellon University), looks at another important,
foundational issue: the relationship between humans
and the natural world. Offering a more holistic
discussion, it considers the possibility that human
enhancement technologies may change, or even
eliminate, the species Homo sapiens. The discussion
draws from environmental ethics literature on the
value of preserving species in asking whether such
enhancing technologies are morally permissible or
not.
Our fourth paper, “The Opposite of Human
Enhancement: Nanotechnology and the Blind Chick-
en Problem” by Paul Thompson (Michigan State
University), takes a novel, darker approach to the
debate: It looks at the issue of dis-enhancing non-
human animals, as is currently done for food
production, to inform closely-related issues with
engineering humans. This discussion sets the stage
for not only deliberately handicapping bodies but also
weaponizing or modifying them for someone else’s
ends [5].
Our fifth and final paper, “Ethics, Speculation, and
Values” by Rebecca Roache (Oxford University),
appropriately closes this symposium by responding
to an important meta-question hanging over the entire
debate: Are we squandering too much time in the
human enhancement debate—at the expense of
addressing more urgent, near-term issues with our
limited research resources in ethics—on issues and
scenarios that may or may not arise in the future? She
makes the case that we are justified in our inves-
tigations, that human enhancement is a valuable area
of inquiry.
Taken together, our aim is to provide a sense of
how complex the human enhancement controversy
is—from particular issues to justifying the entire
debate itself—as well as the essential role nanotech-
nology will play here. These papers are not meant to
cover the full range of issues, but they help illuminate
key areas as well as offer perspectives not often heard
in the debate.
Thank you, reader, for your interest in this
escalating debate in science and society. We would
like to also thank the US National Science Foundation
for its generous support, under grant numbers
0620694 and 0621021. (Any opinions, findings, and
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this
material are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Science
Foundation.) We also thank John Weckert, editor of
NanoEthics journal, as well as the authors of the
papers that follow. Finally, we thank Marcus Adams
for his editing assistance.
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